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Abstract: The study investigates relationships between manufacturers and their key retailers in 
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of this topic has been growing with such global phenomena in retailing as concentration and 
internationalization, the emergence of mega-retailers, the growth of private brands and the rise 
of the Internet. The balance of this factors has led to a shift in bargaining power towards retailers. 
On this backdrop, the goal of this study is to examine how a manufacturer’s dependence on the 
key retailer shapes this relationship in terms of its cooperative/competitive dimensions, scope 
and outcomes, and if the dominant business models of manufacturers are moderating the focal 
relationship. The three types of business models include: Traditionalists (unwilling to enter into long-
term partnerships despite lacking unique assets), Market Players (the most fl exible of the three in 
choosing their partners and deciding on the scope of cooperation due to their unique assets) and 
Contractors (the most dependent on their business partners due to their lack of well-developed 
marketing functions). Data for the study were collected through a representative CATI survey of 
580 manufacturers and analyzed with PLS structural equation modeling. The fi ndings indicate that 
high manufacturer dependence on the key retailer can have positive impacts on manufacturers by 
inducing greater benefi ts from cooperation. This effect is the most pronounced among Traditionalists 
and is the least visible in Market Players, with Contractors showing intermediate effects. Some 
likely reasons for these positive effects include know-how transfers, extension of the distribution 
network, manufacturing contracts for private labels and marketing support from the key retailer.
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Introduction
Relationships in the supply chain have been 
a longstanding theme of research (e.g. Ailawadi 
et al., 2010; Corsten & Kumar, 2005; Vlachos 
et al., 2008). Manufacturer-retailer relationships 
have changed in recent decades due to the 
growing power of retailers (Amato & Amato, 
2009) reinforced by concentration processes in 
retailing (Burt & Sparks, 2003), the emergence 
of mega-retailers and their internationalization, 
and the rise of the Internet. The shift in 
bargaining power toward retailers is manifested 
by the growing market shares of private brands 
(Chimhundu, 2011). On the heels of these trends, 
changes have come in business models of both 
retailers and producers (e.g. Ritala et al., 2014; 
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Witek-Hajduk, 2017). The role of retailers has 
evolved “from mere service providers to market 
makers” (Hamilton & Petrovic, 2011). The 
growing power of retailers has prompted many 
manufacturers of consumer goods to establish 
their own or controlled retail channels and/or to 
produce goods under retailers’ private labels often 
competing with their own brands. Consequently, 
various forms of cooperation and competition 
have developed giving rise to the phenomenon 
of coopetition (Kim et al., 2013).
Many scholars contributed conceptual 
papers on inter-organizational cooperation 
and coopetition (e.g. Gnyawali & Park, 2016), 
but much fewer offered empirical evidence, 
especially from the manufacturer’s perspective. 
What little empirical research is available is 
mostly qualitative (Chow et al., 2011) with 
only a few studies relying on quantitative 
data (e.g. Teller et al., 2016), often taking 
the retailer’s viewpoint and centering on fast 
moving consumer goods (Kim et al., 2013). The 
current study provides quantitative evidence 
on cooperation and coopetition between the 
manufacturer and its key retailing partner. Its 
unique aspect is that it looks at these interactions 
through the lens of the manufacturer’s business 
model, following suggestions in the literature 
that the dominant business model can affect 
cooperative/coopetitive behavior and its 
outcomes (e.g. Storbacka, 2011).
This research proposes and tests a structural 
equation model on a random sample of 580 
Polish manufacturers of consumer goods to 
investigate how the manufacturers’ dependence 
on their key retailing partner shapes the nature 
and outcomes of cooperative/coopetitive 
relationships. We compare three manufacturing 
business models while accounting for company 
size (medium and large employment) and 
ownership (solely Polish or at least partially 
controlled by foreign capital).
The paper is organized as follows. First, 
we overview pertinent literature sources and 
develop hypotheses. Next, we outline the 
conceptual framework and research methods. 
And fi nally, we present fi ndings, discuss 
conclusions and offer recommendations.
1. Literature Review and Research 
Hypotheses
Inter-fi rm relationships are considered from 
the perspective of both cooperation and 
competition – the concepts that are no longer 
treated as incompatible exchange approaches 
but parts of the same relationship. Bengtsson, 
Hinttu and Kock (2003) distinguish between 
four types of relations: cooperation (without 
competition), competition (without cooperation), 
coexistence (no competition or cooperation), 
and coopetition (a combination of cooperative 
and competitive behaviors of market rivals who 
benefi t by complementing each other in some 
activities but competing in other parts of the 
value chain).
Manufacturer-retailer relationships often 
comprise a mixture of horizontal and vertical 
cooperation and competition (e.g. Kotzab & 
Teller, 2003; Teller et al., 2016) with varying 
intensity of cooperation and competition 
streams.  These relationships can be of two 
types: “pure”, traditional cooperation (a lack 
of competition between a manufacturer 
and retailer) or coopetition (a mix of both 
competition and cooperation between the 
parties). Coopetition frequently occurs when 
a manufacturer maintains its own retail stores 
competing with a retailer’s facilities and/or 
a retailer sells its private labels that compete 
with the manufacturer brands (Kim et al., 2013). 
The cooperative dimension of this relationship 
involves joint actions of the manufacturer 
and retailer to pursue joint benefi ts, while the 
competitive dimension is refl ected in individual 
actions aimed at achieving private goals by 
outperforming the partner (Kim et al., 2013).
Among key issues in inter-organizational 
relationship studies are power and dependence 
(e.g. Essabbara, Zrikem, & Zolghadri, 2016). 
Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott (2003) identify two 
sources of power in the manufacturer-retailer 
relationship: traditional mediated power (based 
on rewards derived from the ability to infl uence 
the allocation of incentives, and coercive, 
linked to threats, punishments and sanctions) 
and non-mediated power (expert knowledge 
and privileged information in a particular area). 
Dependence implies that one of the parties 
of a manufacturer-retailer relationship has 
more power over the other party (Tangpong 
et al., 2015). This power means that the goals 
of the weaker party, which can be achieved 
in this relationship, are mediated by the 
stronger partner (Matopoulos et al., 2007). 
A manufacturer’s power over its key retailer 
results from the retailer’s dependence on 
the producer and vice versa. Because of the 
reciprocal character of the manufacturer-retailer 
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relationship, the interdependency between the 
parties is closely tied to the balance of power 
between them. Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) 
state that the dependence in the inter-fi rm 
relationship exists either when benefi ts from that 
relation are crucial to the weaker company or 
when there are few possibilities of replacing the 
stronger partner. Manufacturer-retailer power 
asymmetry increases dependence in favor of 
the more powerful company and exacerbates 
the imbalance in risk-reward sharing, inhibiting 
the intensity of cooperation (Matopoulos et al., 
2007). The side of a relationship that wields more 
power can use it to impose its requirements on 
the weaker party and it can aggravate confl icts 
strengthening the competitive dimension of the 
relationship (Radaev, 2013).
The literature sources discussed thus 
far indicate that increased dependence 
resulting from asymmetry of power fosters 
the competitive aspect of the relationship and 
inhibits its cooperative dimension. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that:
H1: The manufacturer’s dependence on 
the key retailer is positively associated with the 
competitive dimension of the manufacturer-
retailer relationship.
H2: The manufacturer’s dependence on 
the key retailer is negatively associated with 
the cooperative dimension of the manufacturer-
retailer relationship.
Manufacturers can cooperate with retailers 
in a wide range of value chain processes (e.g. 
Swoboda et al., 2010; Park, 2004; Ailawadi 
et al., 2010), including innovations (R&D, 
market analyses, trend recognition, product/
assortment design, launching new products/
brands), logistics (manufacturing, distribution, 
stock management, sales fl oor management) 
and customer-centric functions (category 
management, promotional activities, shop 
design, price promotions, loyalty programs, 
customer services). Manufacturer-key retailer 
relationships vary in scope with interactions 
extending across different value chain 
processes. According to Bengtsson and Kock 
(2000), fi rms tend to cooperate more in the 
value chain activities that are further away from 
customers and compete in the activities that 
are closer to customers. Overall, the literature 
is clear that cooperation tends to result in more 
joint activities and an increased cooperation 
scope, while competition makes parties more 
reticent to engage in joint activities and add 
shared resources to the relationship. Thus, we 
hypothesize:
H3: Cooperation scope is negatively 
associated with the competitive dimension of 
the manufacturer-retailer relationship (H3a), 
but positively associated with its cooperative 
dimension (H3b) and the manufacturer’s 
dependence on the key retailer (H3c).
Strategies of cooperation and coopetition 
are implemented to improve the performance 
of cooperating fi rms (Geraudel & Salvetat, 
2014; Pereira, Brito, & Mariotto, 2013). They 
allow partners in a manufacturer-retailer 
relationship to focus on their core competences 
and main processes in the value chain, which 
helps to achieve economies of scale and 
acquire new skills and capabilities (Park et al., 
2004). Consequently, a company can avoid 
internalizing activities that are not congruent 
with its assets and competencies by using 
strategic resources obtained from the partner 
and by establishing access barriers to these 
resources for third parties, which helps create 
a semi-permanent competitive advantage 
(Medcof, 2001). Joint competitive advantage, 
derived from the relational rent generated by 
the unique assets that cannot be obtained 
individually (Lavie, 2006) is a key benefi t of the 
cooperative dimension of the manufacturer-
retailer relationship. Researchers (e.g. Qubina 
et al., 2006; Kumar & Steenkamp, 2007; 
Gomez-Arias et al., 2008) identifi ed multiple 
benefi ts for manufacturers from cooperation 
with retailers, including: economies of 
scale, better capacity utilization, increased 
profi tability, reduced production costs, access 
to proprietary distribution channels and 
marketing skills, lowered expenditures on the 
creation of manufacturer brands, support for 
new product development, improved inventory 
management, increased manufacturer brand 
awareness, higher resistance to economic 
crises, increased market share, improvement 
of customer preferences, and diversifi cation 
of product lines. The magnitude of benefi ts 
is, therefore, a function of the scope of 
cooperation and the range of joint activities. 
Manufacturers and retailers cooperate in 
value chains to achieve joint benefi ts for both 
parties while simultaneously competing for 
individual benefi ts (Kim et al., 2013). Many 
scholars (e.g. Palmatier et al., 2006) assert that 
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cooperation in the supply chain leads to better 
results than rivalry. Kim et al. (2013) discuss 
the impact of cooperative, competitive and 
synergistic (coopetitive) strategies in retailer-
supplier relations on joint and individual benefi ts. 
Accordingly, the stronger is the cooperative 
dimension of the coopetition strategy of the 
retailer, the greater are the joint benefi ts shared 
with the focal supplier, but supply fl exibility 
seems to be unaffected. On the other hand, 
a stronger competitive dimension in a retailer’s 
strategy does not correspond with greater joint 
benefi ts, but it tends to increase supply fl exibility. 
Of the three strategies, the synergistic one 
is the most balanced option on account of its 
positive effect on both joint benefi ts and supply 
fl exibility. The authors conclude that competing 
with the focal supplier does not help the retailer 
achieve greater joint benefi ts (Kim et al., 2013). 
According to Qubina et al. (2006), benefi ts for 
manufacturers from cooperation with retailers 
in producing private labels depend on their 
relative competitive positions, in particular if 
a manufacturer is the market leader. Soberman 
and Parker (2006) observe that when a retailer 
and a manufacturer have signifi cant market 
power, both sides of the relationship may 
benefi t from offering the retailer’s brands of 
the equivalent quality to the manufacturer’s 
brands. It is also noted that a manufacturer’s 
cooperation with only one retailer can make it 
diffi cult to achieve such benefi ts as economies 
of scale and cost reductions (Corsten & Felde, 
2005). Producing private brands carries several 
non-trivial risks for the manufacturer, as it can 
compromise its brands’ equity, including image, 
raise complexity of operational processes 
thus infl ating costs, and increase dependence 
on the retailer in no small part due to sharing 
knowledge on the market and proprietary 
innovative technologies (e.g. Rubio & Yagüe, 
2008; Kumar & Steenkamp, 2007). These 
negative effects are the more likely to occur the 
higher is the manufacturer’s dependence on 
the key retailer.
From the above discussion of cooperation 
benefi ts and their antecedents, we propose:
H4: Relationship benefi ts are positively 
associated with the cooperation scope (H4a), 
the cooperative dimension of the relationship 
(H4b), and negatively associated with the 
manufacturer’s dependence on the key retailer 
(H4c) and the competitive dimension of the 
relationship (H4d).
Some authors suggested investigating 
relationships in the supply chain through the 
lens of business models used by relationship 
participants, believing that this perspective 
helps to identify new data patterns and better 
explains existing relations (e.g. Trkman et al., 
2015). From an analytical viewpoint, the concept 
of a business model is considered an effective, 
holistic approach to systemic examination of 
companies, particularly their value propositions, 
resource allocation and performance (Zott et al., 
2011). The literature offers many different views 
on the business model: e.g. as the business 
logic of a company in a particular business 
unit (Osterwalder et al., 2005), or the way an 
organization, together with its key stakeholders, 
creates value propositions for customers 
(Kallio et al., 2006). There is, however, no 
consensus among scholars on what constitutes 
a business model. According to Osterwalder et 
al. (2005), a business model consists of a value 
proposition, customer segments, customer 
relationships, key activities, key partners, 
key resources, cost structure, channels and 
revenue streams. Dudzik et al. (2008) state that 
a business model comprises a value proposition 
for customers, processes in the internal value 
chain, company relationships with other fi rms in 
the supply chain that serve to create, offer and 
deliver customer value, and revenue streams. 
Despite all these differences, a recurring theme 
in various perspectives on business models is 
that this concept is not limited to the domain 
under the exclusive control of a company, but 
it also involves other actors, such as suppliers 
and distributors and is closely linked with an 
organization’s architecture (Osterwalder et al., 
2005). These characteristics make the business 
model a relevant theoretical framework 
to employ in the context of manufacturer-
retailer relationships, where different roles 
are assigned to involved parties and different 
resource confi gurations are used. According 
to the resource-based view, the dynamics and 
outcomes of business-to-business cooperation 
are dependent on how resources and processes 
within internal value chains were confi gured 
and what was outsourced to external partners 
in the value chain. In fact, one of the premises 
for cooperation in the value chain is the ability 
for sharing complementary resources. As 
Benson-Rea et al. (2013) put it, “business 
models complement each other the more they 
share major physical assets, capabilities and 
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resources”. Moreover, sometimes the decision 
to cooperate entails improving or replacing 
the business model or developing a new one 
(Storbacka, 2011).
To identify the dominant business models 
of manufacturers, we used a classifi cation 
by  Dudzik and Witek-Hajduk (2007) 
distinguishing fi ve categories of business 
models: Traditionalists, Market Players, 
Contractors, Distributors and Integrators. 
Two of the business models are reserved for 
retailers (Distributor and Integrator), but the 
following three categories can be employed by 
manufacturers (Witek-Hajduk, 2017):
1. Traditionalist – relies on offering 
conventional functional benefi ts from its 
products at a competitive price; it does not 
possess unique resources (a strong brand, 
patents, technology); its internal value 
chain is long, including R&D, production, 
marketing, sales and after-sales services; 
most of the revenues are from the sales of 
manufactured products.
2. Market player – derives its value 
proposition for customers from strong 
brands and unique working relationships 
with other members of the value chain; it has 
unique resources (advanced technology, 
strong brands, patents, unique designs, 
recipes and superior managerial skills); its 
internal value chain is long, including R&D, 
production, marketing, sales and after-
sales services; it tends to be the leader of 
its supply chain; its returns are sourced 
from selling goods under own brands, 
supplemented by proceeds from licensing 
and franchising fees.
3. Contractor – specializes in subcontractor 
manufacturing, often using a partner’s 
designs; its value proposition is cost 
effi ciency combined with functional product 
benefi ts; its supply chain is short and 
focused on manufacturing processes; 
the bulk of the revenues comes from 
manufacturing contracts.
These three business models entail 
different approaches to cooperation and 
competition within supply chains, which was 
the main reason for choosing this classifi cation 
as part of the conceptual framework in this 
study. Traditionalists tend to be unwilling to 
enter into long-term partnerships and are 
reluctant outsourcers, even though they rarely 
possess unique assets to merit keeping all 
functions internal. Market Players are the most 
fl exible of the three in choosing their partners 
and deciding on the scope of cooperation. 
Their unique assets make it possible to easily 
scale up and down the number of services 
performed jointly with a partner. In this typology, 
Contractors are liable to be the most dependent 
on business partners due to their lack of well-
developed marketing functions. Accordingly, 
they need to rely on retailers to contract with 
them manufacturing orders for private labels. 
Considering the current state of knowledge 
on the role of business models in shaping 
manufacturer-retailer relationships it is diffi cult 
to develop precise directional hypotheses, 
however the literature offers strong reasons to 
believe that manufacturers following different 
business models will show differences across 
the whole conceptual framework of the study. 
Thus, we posit:
H5: Manufacturers following different 
business models will have different values of 
regression weights for associations indicated in 
hypotheses H1 through H4.
2. Conceptual Framework 
and Research Methods
In this study we model vertical relationships 
in the supply chain between manufacturers 
and retailers with a framework that involves 
fi ve composite variables (or constructs): 1) 
the manufacturer’s dependence on the key 
retailer; two dimensions of manufacturer-
retailer relationships: 2) cooperation and 3) 
competition; 4) cooperation scope; and 5) 
cooperation benefi ts from the manufacturer’s 
perspective. The links among studied variables 
and pertinent hypotheses are illustrated in 
Fig. 1.
The model assumes that the main driver of 
a manufacturer-key retailer relationship is t he 
manufacturer’s dependence on the key retailer, 
which determines the relative bargaining 
power of both parties. The manufacturer’s 
dependence on the key retailer is shaping the 
form of the relationship through the strength 
of its cooperative and competitive dimensions. 
Competitive and cooperative attitudes and 
behaviors drive the scope of the cooperation 
by determining the number of jointly performed 
tasks and functions. The fi nal dependent 
variable in the model is cooperation benefi ts, 
which is hypothesized to be a consequence of 
the scope of cooperation with possibly weaker 
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direct infl uences from other variables in the 
framework.
Empirical data were collected through 
a CATI survey of 613 managers of medium 
and large manufacturers of consumer durable 
products operating in Poland at the end of 
2015 and the beginning of 2016. Sample units 
were selected at random from a database 
encompassing all Polish fi rms meeting the 
eligibility criteria, thus ensuring sample 
representativeness. After removing records 
with incomplete and faulty answers, the net 
sample size was 580.
Respondents were asked questions about 
their relationships with the key retailer who – 
according to the adopted operationalization – 
accounted for the largest percentage of sales of 
durable consumer goods produced by their fi rm 
over the year before the interview. They were 
also given characteristics of three business 
models from Dudzik and Witek-Hajduk (2007) 
and were requested to indicate the one 
best describing their own fi rm. Regarding 
identifi ed dominant business models, the net 
sample comprised of 321 Traditionalists, 131 
Contractors and 128 Market Players.
Following guidance in earlier research, 
the concepts of a manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer, as well as cooperative and 
competitive dimensions of the relationship 
were assumed to be refl ective latent variables 
and operationalized with sets of Likert-scale 
statements (Kim et al., 2013; Witek-Hajduk & 
Zaborek, 2016). In refl ective constructs, the 
direction of relationship goes from a latent 
variable to its indicators, as the latent variable is 
assumed to be the cause and indicators refl ect 
some of its effect. In such a refl ective setup, 
indicators are expected to be highly correlated. 
On the other hand, the scope and benefi ts 
of cooperation were considered formative 
constructs, where causality fl ows from indicators 
to the latent variables, and the indicators can 
represent independent causes that do not need to 
be correlated. Therefore, and what is a common 
practice, formative indicators of cooperation 
scope and benefi ts were operationalized through 
two lists of binary items with yes or no answers. 
Tab. 1 shows the items used in the questionnaire 
together with factor loadings and other metrics 
that are explained later in the paper.
With refl ective constructs, a latent 
variable is typically estimated through linear 
transformations based on the amount of 
shared variance in indicators, while formative 
constructs are often represented by indices 
computed as the means of component 
indicators. These routines were also used in 
Fig. 1: Conceptual model and hypotheses of the study
Source: own elaboration
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Indicators
Factor loadings
Traditiona-
lists
(n = 321)
Market 
Players
(n = 128)
Contractors
(n = 131)
Manufacturer’s dependence on the key retailer
Traditionalists: AVE = 0.568 ; MSV = 0.175; C’s alpha = 0.814; Market Players: AVE = 0.521; 
MSV = 0.214; C’s alpha = 0.764; Contractors: AVE = 0.714 ; MSV = 0.091; C’s alpha = 0.809
In the Polish market of durable consumer goods there are 
no other retailers to offer us similar terms and conditions 
as our key retailer.
0.723 0.638 0.573
The cost of changing our key retailer to a similar one would 
be too high. 0.766 0.837 0.883
It would be diffi cult to compensate for lost earnings from 
cooperating with our key retailer. 0.791 0.779 0.752
It would be diffi cult to compensate for lost revenues from 
cooperating with our key retailer. 0.795 0.761 0.934
It is not possible for us to offer our products through other 
retail networks. 0.690 0.559 0.430
Cooperative dimension of relationship
Traditionalists: AVE = 0.680; MSV = 0.265; C’s alpha = 0.767; Market Players: AVE = 0.720; 
MSV = 0.214; C’s alpha = 0.799; Contractors: AVE = 0.686; MSV = 0.249; C’s alpha = 0.779
We carry out joint projects with the key retailer. 0.832 0.936 0.896
We coordinate supply chain activities with the key retailer. 0.864 0.892 0.890
We have a contract agreement with the key retailer that 
regulates our cooperation. 0.776 0.698 0.681
Competitive dimension of relationship
Traditionalists: AVE = 0.523; MSV = 0.265; C’s alpha = 0.667; Market Players: AVE = 0.617; 
MSV = 0.040;C’s alpha = 0.734; Contractors: AVE = 0.528; MSV = 0.072; C’s alpha = 0.650
Our relationship with the key retailer is best described 
as “fi ghting for a fi xed pie”. 0.934 0.703 0.921
We often fi nd ourselves in confl ict with the key retailer over 
the terms and conditions of cooperation. 0.420 0.505 0.647
The key retailer forces on us their terms and conditions 
of cooperation. 0.722 0.643 0.521
Cooperation scope 
Factor loadings and other metrics are not computed for formative constructs
Our cooperation with the key retailer includes: 1) launching new brands and products on the market; 
2) product category management at the key retailer’s stores; 3) manufacturing contracts from the key 
retailer involving exclusive or non-exclusive products; 4) supply management; (5) acquiring market 
information; 5) promotional activities; 6) customer service; 7) sales discounts; 8) loyalty programs.
Cooperation benefi ts
Factor loadings cannot be computed for a formative construct
The relationship with the key retailer enabled us to: 1) limit risk; 2) achieve and/or maintain cost 
advantage over other manufacturers; 3) increase productivity; 4) strengthen our relationships with 
consumers; 5) develop our bargaining power with suppliers; 6) improve the image of our brands/
company; 7) enhance the quality of our products and services; 8) increase the visibility of our products 
at the key retailer’s points of sale; 9) increase our marketing know-how; 10) raise our market share; 
11) gain access to new geographical markets, new segments of consumers and/or distribution channels.
Source: own elaboration
Tab. 1: Indicators of construct variables in the study
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the current study. All required transformations 
and computations on raw data to explore 
regression paths among latent variables were 
performed with SMART PLS 3.2, a statistical 
software package for estimating structural 
equation models with the partial least squares 
method (PLS). The decision to use the PLS 
SEM method instead of another popular SEM 
technique relying on covariance matrices 
was driven by the two features of collected 
data: (1) most of the observable variables 
(indicators) did not have a multivariate normal 
distribution, which is a requirement for the 
covariance based SEM, and (2) the need 
to estimate formative constructs favors PLS 
SEM, which is recommended for such analysis 
tasks (Hair et al., 2014, p.15). In SmartPLS, 
p-values for statistical tests were obtained 
using bootstrapping with 5000 subsamples and 
the comparison of regression paths for different 
business models was accomplished with the 
multi-group analysis procedure.
3. Research Findings
Considering that the core part of the analysis 
involves contrasting structural models for 
three groups of fi rms, it is necessary to 
explore measurement invariance. According to 
Henseler et al. (2017, p. 409), measurement 
invariance ensures that different group-
specifi c regression weights do not result 
from distinctive content and the meanings of 
the refl ective latent variables across groups. 
Our formative constructs have the same 
meanings because their scores were obtained 
by assuming the same contribution of each 
indicator across every group; with refl ective 
constructs the meaning depends on factor 
loadings and these can vary across groups. 
If measurement invariance is missing, such 
differences are diffi cult to interpret. In this study, 
we investigated measurement invariance 
by comparing factor loadings for refl ective 
constructs (Tab. 1) with a permutation test 
available in SMART PLS (Hair et al., 2017, pp. 
159–161). The test results were all insignifi cant 
at the 0.05 level, pointing to a lack of meaningful 
differences between factor loadings. The sole 
exception was the statement “It is not possible 
for us to offer our products through other retail 
networks” (p = 0.042), but with four other 
measurement invariant statements under the 
same latent variable it is safe to assume that 
this will not be a source of substantive bias.
In contrast to the covariance-based SEM, 
in the partial least squares SEM there are no 
widely accepted overall goodness of fi t tests, 
hence the model quality must be determined 
with individual metrics of internal consistency, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity (Hair 
et al., 2012). Factor loadings contained in Tab. 1 
imply that all three structural equation models 
have acceptable quality because: Cronbach’s 
alphas are greater than 0.6 (Malhotra, 2010, 
p. 287), AVEs (Average Variance Extracted) 
are higher than 0.5 (Hair et al., 2009), and for 
all refl ective constructs AVEs are greater than 
MSVs (Maximum Shared Variance).
Once the quality of the underlying 
measurement model was deemed acceptable, 
standardized regression weights and p-values 
in Tab. 2 can be used for hypothesis testing. 
They inform about the strength and direction 
of relationships between latent variables in the 
structural model.
From Tab. 2, a total of 12 regression 
paths across all the three structural models 
have regression weights signifi cantly different 
from zero. Regardless of the business model, 
the cooperative dimension of relationship 
was positively correlated with cooperation 
scope, and higher levels of cooperation scope 
corresponded with greater cooperation benefi ts. 
Also, the manufacturer’s dependence on the 
key retailer had a positive link with cooperation 
benefi ts. This gives full support to hypotheses 
H3c, H4a and H4c. H1 is true for Traditionalists 
and Market Players but not for Contractors, who 
did not show signifi cant association between 
the manufacturer’s dependence on the key 
retailer and the degree of cooperative aspects 
in the relationship with the retailer. Interestingly, 
Traditionalists had meaningful negative links 
between the manufacturer’s dependence on the 
key retailer and the competitive dimension of the 
relationship, which is opposite to the direction 
hypothesized in H2.
To explore Hypothesis 5, multigroup 
comparisons were performed with the MGA 
tool in SmartPLS leading to the discovery of 
six signifi cant differences between business 
models at the p-level of 0.05. For Contractors, 
the manufacturer’s dependence on the key 
retailer had a much weaker link with the 
degree of cooperative relations than for 
Market Players and Traditionalists. Market 
Players and Traditionalists were apparently 
unwilling to engage in close cooperation with 
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H1 Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Cooperative dimension of 
the relationship
-0.418 0.000 -0.463 0.000 -0.007 0.971
H2 Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Competitive dimension of 
the relationship
-0.219 0.024 -0.199 0.360 -0.200 0.176
H3a Competitive dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation scope
0.091 0.327 0.144 0.367 0.063 0.652
H3b Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Cooperation scope
0.103 0.224 0.043 0.752 0.139 0.302
H3c Cooperative dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation scope
0.452 0.000 0.433 0.000 0.484 0.000
H4a Cooperation scope  
Cooperation benefi ts 0.362 0.000 0.624 0.000 0.294 0.018
H4b Cooperative dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation benefi ts
0.057 0.517 0.021 0.823 -0.023 0.833
H4c Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Cooperation benefi ts
0.433 0.000 0.216 0.048 0.247 0.043
H4d Competitive dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation benefi ts
-0.002 0.987 -0.234 0.278 -0.089 0.387
Source: own elaboration
Note: Bootstrapping based on 5000 subsamples; signifi cant values marked in bold.
Tab. 2: Regression weights with signifi cance tests for estimated path models
the dominant partner, while for Contractors 
there was no such effect. With Market 
Players the correlation between the scope of 
cooperation and benefi ts was stronger than for 
either Contractors or Traditionalists. Finally, 
Traditionalists showed much stronger positive 
direct effects between the manufacturer’s 
dependence on the key retailer and 
cooperation benefi ts in comparison to Market 
Players and Traditionalists. The existence 
of these differences in some but not all 
regression paths gives partial support to H5.
Overall, the whole structural model 
explained 28.7% of variance in relationship 
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benefi ts for Traditionalists, 42.1% for Market 
Players and 16.8% for Contractors.
Considering total effects along both 
direct and indirect paths, the manufacturer’s 
dependence on the key retailer explained 13.8% 
of variance in cooperation benefi ts reported by 
Traditionalists, while for Contractors and Market 
Players it was 9.1% and 1.8%, respectively. 
For all business models, despite differences in 
effect sizes, greater manufacturer dependence 
on the key retailer seemed to induce more 
relationship benefi ts.
To verify the robustness of the hypothesis 
tests, we investigated possible moderation 
effects with the ownership status of the 
manufacturer (only Polish vs. various levels of 
foreign capital) and its size (medium or large 
fi rms according to the employment criterion with 
the split point at 250 employees).
The fractions of respective business models 
in each of the four subgroups are presented in 
Tab. 3.
Interestingly, all subgroups have very similar 
structures in terms of business models used, 
which is confi rmed by insignifi cant outcomes 
of the chi-square tests of independence. This 
suggests that the choice of a business model 
was not driven by the size or the ownership 
status of a company, implying that the business 
model taxonomy employed in this research was 
appropriate.
Using the same tool for multigroup analysis 
in SMART PLS as previously for comparing 
business models, we obtained signifi cance values 
for regression weight differentials computed for 
respective pairwise combinations of fi rms.
Splitting the sample into large and medium 
companies revealed fi ve signifi cant differences 
in regression weights across the three business 
models. Perhaps most interestingly, large 
Traditionalists had a positive link between their 
dependence on the key retailer and the extent 
of the competitive relationship (0.428), while the 
medium ones showed a negative association 
(-0.310) with a difference between the two at 
0.738. Furthermore, the more competitive 
was a large Traditionalist’s relationship with 
the retailer, the more negative was its impact 
on cooperation benefi ts (-0.458). In medium 
fi rms, such an effect was not found (0.022). 
These two observations seem to correspond 
with one of the defi ning traits of the traditionalist 
business model: a sense of independence, 
which is arguably stronger among large versus 
medium Traditionalist. This sentiment can lead 
to the development of antagonistic interactions 
if the balance of power is strongly in favor of 
a business partner, thus, posing a threat to 
the manufacturer’s independence. However, it 
seems that such an attitude is harmful to large 
Traditionalists, as competitive relationships 
appear to diminish relationship benefi ts.
Business models
Employment Ownership
Medium
(50–249 
employees)
Large
(at least 250 
employees)
Only Polish 
capital
Foreign
capital
Traditionalist
Count 233 88 115 206
% 57.4% 50.6% 56.4% 54.8%
Market player
Count 83 45 49 79
% 20.4% 25.9% 24.0% 21.0%
Contractor
Count 90 41 40 91
% 22.2% 23.6% 19.6% 24.2%
Whole sample
Count 406 174 204 376
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-square tests 
of independence
Pearson chi-square = 2.748; 
df = 2; p-value = 0.253
Pearson chi-square = 1.839; 
df = 2; p-value = 0.399
Source: own elaboration
Tab. 3: Frequency distributions of business models in each employment and ownership group
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Also, large Market Players tend to 
display stronger associations between 
cooperation scope and its two antecedents: 
the manufacturer’s dependence on the key 
retailer and the competitive dimension of 
the relationship (differences in regression 
weights of 0.411 and 0.352, respectively). As 
was explained earlier, part of Market Players’ 
strategy is enhancing the scope of cooperation 
to benefi t from synergies with business partners. 
This fi nding implies that larger Market Players 
might have more resources and possibilities to 
establish more comprehensive relationships.
Large Contactors have economies of 
scale and more experience, which seemingly 
brings more benefi ts from the same scope of 
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H1 Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Cooperative dimension of 
the relationship
0.230 0.492 -0.026 0.900 -0.322 0.410
H2 Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Competitive dimension of 
the relationship
0.738 0.038 -0.245 0.499 0.194 0.600
H3a Competitive dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation scope
0.235 0.308 -0.312 0.273 -0.092 0.756
H3b  Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Cooperation scope
0.118 0.597 0.411 0.093 -0.032 0.907
H3c Cooperative dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation scope
-0.101 0.618 0.352 0.048 0.213 0.255
H4a Cooperation scope  
Cooperation benefi ts 0.122 0.476 -0.074 0.736 0.419 0.043
H4b Cooperative dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation benefi ts
0.010 0.965 0.170 0.496 0.150 0.563
H4c Manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer  
Cooperation benefi ts
-0.056 0.817 -0.008 0.981 0.093 0.766
H4d Competitive dimension 
of the relationship  
Cooperation benefi ts
-0.509 0.076 0.208 0.534 0.114 0.660
Source: own elaboration
Tab. 4: Regression weight differentials with signifi cance values for large and medium-sized traditionalists, market players and contractors
EM_1_2020.indd   177 14.4.2020   10:12:47
178 2020, XXIII, 1
Marketing and Trade
cooperation than their smaller counterparts 
(a difference of 0.419). At the core of Contractors’ 
business model is providing manufacturing 
services to retailers, making volume and unit 
cost crucial aspects of profi tability, which is 
refl ected in our research.
The above insights modify the testing 
outcomes of some hypotheses. H2 is supported 
for large Traditionalists, while it still shows the 
opposite-than-anticipated relationships for 
medium Traditionalists and Market Players of 
both sizes. Although H3b was rejected for the 
whole sample, accounting for the fi rm size 
provided evidence that it could be true for large 
Market Players. Finally, H4d can be deemed 
confi rmed for large Traditionalists (but when 
fi rms of both sizes were pooled together, there 
were no signifi cant relationships of any kind).
When the fi rms were split according 
to the dominant source of capital, the only 
meaningful difference (at the 10% signifi cance 
level) between Polish and foreign owned 
manufacturers was the regression path for 
Market Players from the competitive dimension 
of the relationship to the scope of cooperation. 
Polish owned Market Players had a regression 
weigh greater by 0.503 than their foreign 
counterparts, implying that there is a stronger 
positive link between competitive aspects of 
the relationship and the number of cooperation 
areas for Polish Market Players. Because no 
other signifi cant effects were found, we chose 
not to include a table with detailed regression 
weight comparisons to save space. This 
outcome modifi es the testing results of H3a, 
which seems to be supported in the subgroup 
of Market Players with solely Polish ownership. 
Other comparisons did not yield signifi cant 
results suggesting similar causal mechanism 
in both groups of companies, which permits 
to keep in force the test results of pertinent 
hypotheses.
4 Conclusions, Recommendations 
and Limitations of the Study
4.1 Theoretical Implications 
of the Study
The fi ndings point to the coexistence of 
cooperation and competition between 
manufacturers and their key retailers, 
suggesting the coopetitive nature of this 
relations. This conclusion is borne out by 
a signifi cant, positive correlation between 
the latent variables representing competitive 
and cooperative aspects of the relationship 
(Pearson’s R = 0.4 for the whole sample). The 
correlation indicates that both aspects of the 
relationship change in the same direction in 
response to varying levels of the power of the 
key retailer.
The role of the manufacturer’s dependence 
on the key retailer is only partially congruent 
with the authors’ expectations. It seems that 
the manufacturer’s dependence does not have 
a signifi cant effect, either positive or negative, 
on competitive behavior in two subgroups of 
companies: Market Players and Contractors. 
A considerable negative association does 
exist for large Traditionalists, while medium 
Traditionalists show a weak negative correlation. 
At the same time, stronger dependence on the 
key retailer coincided with weaker cooperative 
behavior among Traditionalists and Market 
Players. Interestingly, Contractors did not show 
any meaningful links between dependence 
on the retailer and the competitive and 
collaborative nature of the relationship.
These fi ndings imply that many 
manufacturers are unwilling to enter into 
a partnership with too strong retailers, due 
to a risk of an even greater dependence on 
the partner and a lock-up in a long-term, 
possibly infl exible arrangement that can 
turn unfavourable over time. This was the 
strongest for Traditionalists, who according to 
the characteristics of the business model are 
fi ercely independent, sometimes even despite 
lacking adequate resources, and Market 
Players, who are aggressive and expansionistic, 
and would perceive higher dependence levels 
as a threat to their market position and strategy. 
Conversely, this pattern was not found in 
Contractors, possibly because this business 
model is built around dependence on retailers 
that are strong enough to be developing their 
own brands but outsourcing their production.
Literature suggests that rivalry and confl icts 
in inter-organizational relations rather than being 
triggered by adversarial actions of a partner, 
can be a function of the intensity of cooperation 
(Chow et al., 2011) and governance. Power 
balance in business relations was proposed to 
be an effective tool for achieving compatibility 
of goals, unifying organizational cultures 
and processes, reducing inter-organizational 
confl icts (Lacoste, 2016), and promoting the 
intensity of cooperation. In this study, we 
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measured the imbalance of power in favor of 
the key retailer, who can use it to enforce more 
centralized governance schemes that, although 
hampering the intensity of cooperation, 
can result in more ordered and streamlined 
routines which contribute to lower ambiguity 
and thus opportunities for confl ict. What could 
have lowered the reported competitiveness in 
manufacturer-retailer relations for Traditionalists 
was “explicitness of governance”, expressed in 
precisely defi ned responsibilities and roles in 
manufacturing contracts (Brown et al., 2006).
The negative correlation between the 
manufacturer’s dependence on the focal 
retailer and the competitive dimension of the 
relationship could be partially explained by 
the already mentioned positive links between 
cooperative and competitive elements of the 
relation (i.e. weaker cooperation leads to 
fewer occasions for confl ict) and more ordered 
interactions. Also, manufacturers who are 
markedly weaker than their retailers might try 
to consciously avoid occasions for confl ict out 
of fear of retribution by the retailer, for example 
through downsizing production orders. This is 
congruent with several previous studies where 
evidence was found for negative outcomes 
in supplier-retailer cooperation arising from 
confl icts between partners (Radaev, 2013). 
This is especially relevant for manufacturers 
employing multi-channel distribution strategies 
combining traditional and online channels (Kim 
& Chun, 2018).
 Despite anecdotal evidence to the contrary, 
high dependence of the manufacturer on its 
key retailer can in fact increase the amount 
of benefi ts for manufacturers. This effect was 
particularly pronounced for Traditionalists, 
probably due to the largest room for 
improvement that these types of companies 
could achieve through interactions with a more 
powerful and better organized retailing partner. 
Here, we can speculate, that the main source 
of benefi ts is the adoption of know-how (e.g. in 
marketing) and new skills, which can foster – 
among other effects – enhanced productivity 
(e.g. due to cooperation with the retailer in 
launching new products, brand development 
and joint promotions). Also, a better utilization 
of production capacity could be of issue. This 
explanation ties in closely with the fi ndings 
of a recent quantitative study on value co-
creation by cooperating manufacturers and 
retailers (Chaurasia, 2018). The study reported 
that sharing technical, cultural and strategic 
resources builds competencies and leads 
to competitive advantages for retailers and 
manufacturers. We believe that similar effect 
occurred in our research. Close cooperation 
can even lead to fundamental changes in 
business models, which were found to be 
“continuously emergent and transient” (La 
Rocca & Snehota, 2017); here, one likely 
transition is a Traditionalist transforming into 
a Contractor, under pressure from the key 
retailer if benefi ts are clear.
It seems that Contractors – in contrast to 
fi rms employing other business models – are so 
strongly dependent on orders from retailers that 
they do not hesitate to develop close cooperative 
ties even with much stronger partners. This 
pattern fi ts with their main defi ning attribute of 
producing goods under retailer brands, rather 
than their own brands. On the other hand, both 
Traditionalists and Market Players appear to be 
more selective and choose to cooperate with 
weaker rather than stronger retailing partners. 
Empirical research of Gómez and Rubio Benito 
(2008) supports the rationale for cooperation in 
manufacturing of private labels by “non-leading 
manufacturers” and provides evidence against 
this practice by “leading manufacturers”. 
Moreover, according to Gomez-Arias and Bello-
Acebron (2008), a “high-quality manufacturer” 
produces a private brand only if a retailer 
positions it as premium and a “low-quality 
manufacturer” is willing to make private 
labels independently of its positioning. In the 
taxonomy of business models adopted for this 
research, it was Contractors who typically did 
not own brands and could be hardly considered 
“leading manufacturers”, thus this apparent lack 
of selectiveness on the part of Contractors with 
whom to cooperate fi nds support in theoretical 
thinking by other authors.
The position of Market Players is unique in 
that their benefi ts from cooperation are explained 
the most by the scope of the relationship rather 
than other factors. One explanation is that 
Market Players are more fl exible than other 
business models, have better know-how and 
skill sets, and can more readily adjust the 
range of joint projects to optimize the use of 
shared skills and resources. Market Players, by 
defi nition, can cooperate in various value chain 
activities, such as R&D, product and assortment 
design, launching new products or brands, 
manufacturing, logistics, stock management, 
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sales promotion, co-branding, joint promotions 
and category management. Because of this 
extensive set of capacities, Market Players can 
more freely regulate the magnitude of partners’ 
involvement, to maximize the amount of benefi ts.
4.2 Managerial Recommendations
The key practical conclusion is the observation 
that retailer-supplier relationships dominated 
by the key retailer are frequently a source of 
benefi ts to the involved manufacturer. These 
benefi ts are driven by the retailer sharing its 
resources that include, among other things, 
its distribution system, logistical experience, 
strong fi nancial position, marketing expertise 
and brand image. It seems that to make use of 
this benefi ts it is worth the risk to enter a long-
term cooperation with powerful retailers. This 
especially applies to fi rms that could benefi t the 
most from new know-how (Traditionalists) and 
new manufacturing orders (Contractors).
From a practical standpoint what also 
matters is the nature of this relationship. Our 
research suggests that even though coopetition 
is a fact in manufacturer-retailer interactions, as 
shown by concomitant variance of cooperative 
and competitive elements of the relationship, it is 
unlikely to have substantive impacts on the scope 
of cooperation and its benefi ts. At the same 
time, the cooperative aspect of the relationship 
is signifi cantly linked with an increased range of 
joint activities (directly) and achieved benefi ts 
(indirectly, through the mediation of cooperation 
scope). These effects were valid for all three 
types of business models, pointing to a possible 
universality of the pattern. There is no clear 
evidence in our data that competition between 
manufacturers and retailers is harmful, however 
if mitigating competitiveness could bolster the 
cooperative aspect of a relationship, this might 
be a noteworthy recommendation to managers. 
The possibilities to reduce competitiveness with 
retailers are available to all business models. 
Market Players, who are strong brand suppliers 
and often market leaders, could, for example, 
develop with retailers joint marketing programs 
aimed at improving consumer experience. 
Traditionalists, frequently secondary brand 
manufacturers, could consider curtailing their 
portfolio of own brands with weaker market 
positions, in favor of manufacturing private 
retailer labels (Hogarth-Scott, 1999). This would 
push the Traditionalist’s business model to 
transform into that of a Contractor, as described 
by La Rocca and Snehota (2017). Contractors, 
in turn, could work together with retailers on 
improving technical and marketing quality of their 
products and optimizing operational processes.
4.3 Limitations and Further Research 
Directions
One weakness of the study is its focus on 
a single, transition economy, which can show 
different patterns of supply-chain cooperation 
than developed countries. However, we believe 
that such comparative analysis should yield 
similar results, due to Poland’s deep integration 
with the biggest economies of the EU. Moreover, 
most of our sample was involved in exporting 
activities, many fi rms were co-owned by foreign 
capital and their key retailers were multinational 
chains. As another limitation, using alternative 
taxonomies of business models could reveal 
different contrasts and similarities among 
companies. It should also be noted that this 
study depends on evidence from only one 
side of the partnership – manufacturers. But 
the balance of power between the producer 
and retailer is also determined by the retailer’s 
dependence of the producer. So, information 
about the bargaining power of each engaged 
party is not complete and hence could bias 
the results. We investigated the scope of 
cooperation between manufacturers and their 
key retailers, but the scope of competition 
between partners was not considered, and 
it could improve the explanatory power of 
the structural models (e.g. rivalry between 
similar products sold under manufacturer and 
retailer brands, or competition in distribution). 
This overview of limitations suggests several 
directions for further research. Follow-up 
studies could try to replicate our fi ndings in 
different industrial and national contexts. They 
could employ a revised conceptual framework, 
for example by accounting not only for 
manufacturers’ business models but also those 
followed by key retailers. Especially interesting 
would be to investigate dyads of partners. 
However, simultaneously studying pairs of 
partners in a quantitative survey may be very 
challenging to implement due to logistical 
problems and high costs of such research.
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